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This Thesis looked upon current legal regime established by the European Court of Human 
Rights with regard to the liability of Internet intermediaries for user-generated commentaries 
and examined how detrimental it is to the freedom of expression. The aim was to find legal, 
economic and social imperfections of the current state of affairs and propose theoretical 
solutions. The case Delfi AS v. Estonia was taken as a reference point, since it was the first 
time the ECtHR addressed this particular issue. Consequently, the said case was analysed 
from four different perspectives. The first part of research addressed its compatibility with the 
existing ECtHR standards with regard to the media in pre-Internet era. The second part was 
dedicated to the comparative analysis between ECtHR view on intermediary liability and the 
US approach to the issue, as both of them abide by the rule of precedent. The third part 
offered an innovative view of taking into account different media business models, as well as 
linking the economic prosperity with the freedom of speech level. The last part of the research 
analysed scholarly criticism of the Delfi judgment, pointing out the most serious 
imperfections observed by the academics. The main findings of this research are as follows. 
The honourable Court in Strasbourg to a large extent disregarded its own standards of 
treatment of the media and mistakenly failed to identify comments sections as a discussion of 
public interest. The chilling effect that precludes other intermediaries from allowing user 
comments was absolutely neglected by the ECtHR. The harmful impact on the media sector 
economy was also not taken into account by the Court. Finally, the paper offered several 
proposals on how to the ECtHR could enhance depth of its legal analysis and accuracy of 
judgments with regard to liability of Internet intermediaries for user-generated comments.  
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The technological advancement, apart from being a universal good for the whole mankind, is 
also a source of novel legal challenges. A historical example: the truly marvellous invention 
of telegraph, which gave us the way to communicate each other at hitherto impossible speed, 
gave jurists of those times lots of headache, such as the liability for delayed message or 
grammatical mistake. Unsurprisingly, not even the best legal professionals can foretell how to 
regulate a matter that does not exist yet. The online space is today's telegraph - with its very 
own marvels and juristic challenges. One of the greatest features of Internet is the possibility 
to comfortably exercise one’s right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression. Today 
people gladly enjoy this gift of the global network, among others, while lawyers and judges 
(even though they also participate in this feast of freedom, when off duty) are left to deal with 
the disputes arising from this “enjoyable usage”. Internet is not something brand new, yet, 
legal disputes concerning manifold of its aspects continues to clutter up court archives and 
rise hot academic debates. Blogs, comment sections, public chat rooms or interest groups - all 
these brilliant and safe ways to voice your concerns about literally anything, became a major 
source of debates between the experts in law, public policy, economics and other related 
fields. 
One of such controversial topics is the liability for anonymous statements - and there is no 
mistake in this sentence. Once verbal harm is done, whether it is defamation, hate speech or 
even incitement to violence, there is a possibility to find someone accountable. It may be the 
offender himself, if his personality becomes uncovered. The European legal culture also 
allows that the claim may be brought against the website, which gives users, both nameless 
and voluntarily identified, the platform for expressing their views and fails to monitor 
potentially unlawful commentary. In both cases judiciary is required to work on a very thin 
border between two, sometimes conflicting, human rights. What fundamental principle of the 
democratic society possesses greatest importance - to have a possibility to express oneself 
without a fear of censorship or to demand a fair remedy for false and harmful speech? They 
both are equally important in general, however, in each and every specific case one of them 
prevails over another. 
Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights, does not provide any guidance for cases 
when anonymous perpetrator is technically identifiable, with the support of Internet 
intermediary or solely by the state authorities. It may be costly, it may be difficult to discover, 
but it may be possible. From that perspective, is it fair and just for the domestic and later on 
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international courts to leave all the accountability on the shoulders of intermediary? 
Moreover, the Court in Strasbourg fails to acknowledge the potential harmful impact that its 
ruling may have on the media industry and other far-reaching repercussions that the society is 
likely to face with regard to the freedom of press. 
Not every Internet intermediary is an online media portal. Yet, the media sector owns a 
considerable piece of the overall Internet traffic. Pursuant to the 2011 report “The Role of 
Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives” by OECD, the following 
definition in the best way describes main traits of intermediary:  
Internet intermediaries bring together of facilitate transactions between third parties on 
the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products and 
services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to 
third parties.
1 
Information, which users of the media portals generate, usually in a form of comments, falls 
within a scope of giving access and transmitting content independently and voluntarily 
created by third parties. 
Liability of the Internet intermediaries in ECtHR judicature is represented mainly by the 
outcome of the case Delfi AS v Estonia - as long as it is the first ruling in this regard, any 
future case depends on it. The outcome itself have spoken in favour of privacy rights and not 
the freedom of speech. As it is always in the case of conflicting fundamental rights, both sides 
have their advocates. The ultimate goal of this paper is to find a fresh, different outlook on 
how the liability of intermediaries could have been handled by the Strasbourg Court, have it 
taken into account several subjects, matters and interests it did not in reality. The research 
question, thus, can be defined as follows: if the Court have taken into consideration 
more arguments in favour of the freedom of expression, could there have been delivered 
a more precise, more accurate and more balanced judgment? A decision that would 
satisfy all interested parties in general, both private individuals and the world of media? 
Clearly, the ECtHR ultimate task is to examine judgments of  the domestic courts of Council 
of Europe members states, in order to evaluate their compatibility with statutes of the human 
rights Convention. However, within its line of reasoning throughout the judgment, the 
honorable Court usually comments on the variety of issues, not limited to the compatibility 
(sometimes not even limited to the law concepts exclusively); those commentaries later on 
play a major role in future cases of similar nature. Because of that, proposals, which at first 
                                               
1
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing 
Public Policy Objectives.” OECD Publishing. Paris. p. 20. Available on: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-
and-technology/the-role-of-Internet-intermediaries-in-advancing-public-policy-objectives_9789264115644-en. 
Accessed: March 25, 2018. 
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glance may seem a bit too revolutionary and unrealistic, can fit the traditions of European 
Court of Human Rights and truly contribute to the discussion.  
For example, what if the court happened to provide its position on the unmasking of 
anonymous speech and shifting the liability from Internet intermediaries’ shoulders? The very 
existence of the official court’s position (meaning the judgment itself, not judges’ concurring 
or dissenting opinions) on the issue of anonymity, undoubtedly, will have an impact on the 
domestic judgments in Council of Europe member states. When the position of the ECtHR is 
quite well defined, any judge of the local Supreme court would think twice before 
proclaiming a dissenting verdict. Certainly, there is a potential for development and revision 
of older standards. In case when a person responsible for offensive or anyhow unlawful 
comments is easily identifiable, claims are usually brought against the said individual, and the 
platform of communication is irrelevant. However, when the perpetrator remains anonymous, 
it is impossible to make him accountable for his actions and instead of him, now the Internet 
intermediary is at gunpoint. Even knowing the fact that intermediary itself did not originated 
this information, but only provided a platform to do so.  
The whole issue is an important topic of law and society because of multiple factors. There 
only have been a few precedents of liability of intermediaries for users’ defamatory or hate 
speech comments. The penalties imposed on Internet portal in all cases were utterly moderate, 
having rather a symbolic meaning than being a somehow perceptible fine.
2
 Usually portals are 
acting proactively and delete comments that are inconsistent with their user policy. Or do so 
after user-sent reports. In either event it is unlikely that slandered individual would go for a 
lawyer to sue news agency or popular forum, demanding compensation or public apology 
whatsoever. The man on the street could argue that considering such a miserable amount of 
cases
3
 and insignificant penalties, there is no real problem at all. However, even a single 
lawsuit has precedence power over further cases. And because of that, there is a threat to 
online newspapers, news portals, non-commercial organizations and almost anything that one 
considers media outlet. Free and independent media are essential cornerstones of each and 
every democratic society. Not a single political regime with intolerant view on freedom of 
expression is a democracy - because public elections is not the one and only trait of 
democracy, as some people still think today. One can even trace a correlation between 
popularity of such view and level authoritarian mood in the country; take for instance, today’s 
                                               
2
 Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, para. 27, ECHR 2015. Available on: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
155105.  
3
 Ronan Ó Fathaigh. “The chilling effect of liability for online reader comments.” European Human Rights Law 
Review no. 4 (2017): p. 389-390. Available on: ThomsonReuters Westlaw. Accessed: April 24, 2018. 
7 
 
situation of Russia or Poland. In the western world (generally, countries where democratic 
values prevail) mass media importance cannot be underestimated. Its alternative name, the 
Fourth Estate, allegorically puts it on a par with parliament, government and courts - all the 
typical branches of the trias politica rule or separation of powers.
4
  
Without a thoroughly described methodology of research it would be quite difficult to deliver 
an academic product of high quality, as well as for tutors to grasp the flow of working process 
and consistency of the expressed ideas. In order to look at the liability of Internet 
intermediaries in a new fashion, this thesis encompasses a set of four different perspectives. 
Each of them will allow to see the current state of affairs through the prism of hypothetical 
assumptions, that the Court may theoretically consider in the future.  
The first part of this thesis will comprise long-established standards of the ECtHR regarding 
the boundaries of freedom of expression, born out of the most noticeable court rulings, as well 
as the general rules of the game set up by the Article 10 of the ECHR. This point is 
exceptionally important before rushing to the essential questions of this research. It is crucial 
to first understand how the ECtHR could set up limits for the freedom of expression, 
disregarding the online presence of this freedom (and only then move to the realm of Internet. 
Together with the actual case law of ECtHR, this segment of the thesis will assess academic 
writings on the topic or court decision commentary. The application of established standards 
of the European Court of Human Rights will be demonstrated by the example of Jersild v. 
Denmark, a lawsuit about the boundaries of freedom of expression in for the media, quite 
well-known in academic circles. This particular case was chosen because of three reasons. On 
the one hand, it perfectly summarizes all of the existing paradigms of ECtHR with regard to 
the free speech. On another, this trial itself has become a reference point for more than 40 
cases.
5
 What is more, nature of Jersild case very much resembles the nature of main 
proceeding with respect to liability of Internet intermediaries. With some little distinction 
though - absence of the Internet component. When analysing a lawsuit before the ECtHR, one 
cannot simply disregard already acknowledged standards. But pursuing a desire to add at least 
a bit of novelty to this quite common element, there will be an attempt to draw a parallel 
between two cases - Delfi and Jersild. 
The second part of this research project will look at the issues of anonymity notion and how 
those issues were approached in the United States, by assessing the scholarly literature and the 
                                               
4
 Encyclopædia Britannica. “Separation of powers.” Available on: https://www.britannica.com/topic/separation-
of-powers. Accessed: March 24, 2018.  
5
 Case significance of Jersild v. Denmark. Global Freedom of Expression. Columbia University. Available on: 
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/jersild-v-denmark/. Last accessed: April 30, 2018. 
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case law, including both judgments and opinions. The United States and their legal traditions 
were chosen for a reason. First, a comparison between two fundamentally different legal 
cultures, such as American and European, usually provokes a fruitful discussion on whether 
one legal solution is more appropriate than another; can the latter be replaced? And second, 
despite safeguarding human rights in mostly civil law countries, the ECtHR itself much more 
resembles the US courts with their rigorous rule of precedent. Here the thesis will provide 
reader with such answers as: whether unmasking hidden users could be the right practice to 
implement? What kind of precedents there were and how they evolved? 
In the third part of this paper, consequences of the liability of Internet intermediaries will be 
explored from the economic and business perspectives rather than legal one. Since there are 
several quite different revenue models for online platforms, each of them will be analysed 
from the point of economic damage that platform may suffer, in case of extensive application 
of intermediary liability. Here main source of information will be the OECD report on the 
importance of Internet intermediaries for the economy, combined with the deliberate actions 
that web-platform may take in order reduce liability risks, such as burdensome excessive 
moderation, censorship policies and etc. Additionally, here one will have a chance to find out 
about the positive correlation between the economic growth of the country and the level of the 
freedom of press; how these two concepts foster each other simultaneously and what 
conclusions national governments may arrive to, after exploring this interrelation and 
causality. 
The fourth part of the thesis will encompass the variety of critical opinions with respect to the 
judgment in Delfi AS v. Estonia. One may argue that retroactive critique is something anyone 
can do and where were those voices, when the adjudication just started. Indeed, it is relatively 
easy to find major and minor flaws retrospectively. But the again, would there have been 
possible any improvement at all, without the harsh afterword? Finally, the last section will 
summarize all of the finding of preceding sections altogether. Then it will try to come out 
with a brand new, innovative way to upgrade current state of affair with regard to liability of 
Internet intermediaries on European continent. By combining smaller enhancements, there is a 
chance to sculpt a complete, just and accurate improvement, that will work in the best 
interests of the society.  
The findings of this research are based on an exhaustive amount of academic literature and 
case law (mostly the ECtHR, also a bit of US jurisprudence), as well as international and 
national statutory law (from the European Convention on Human Rights to several national 
acts), to better support the evidence. The literature includes a few solid legal grimoires (see, 
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for example, Cyberspace Law: Cases and Materials) and a variety of scholarly writings in 
recognized academic journals on topics of law (The Modern Law Review, The American 
Journal of International Law, Boston University Law Review and others), economics (such as 
the Journal of Media Economics) and even psychology, the latter two for the purpose of 
economic analysis of the freedom of expression. Additionally were used officials reports, for 
the sake of statistics and several dictionary references, when it was necessary to clarify the 
word. Going back to the academic articles, ethical rules of objectivity in the research requires 
different opinions to be  represented, rather that the pile of similar views under the different 
authorship; this paper abides by said rules to the fullest extent possible. 
2. THE ECTHR STANDARDS FOR THE MEDIA IN PRE-INTERNET ERA 
The battle between freedom to hold and express opinions and other fundamental rights of 
people was under the supervision of the European Human Rights Court long before the all-
consuming era of massive Internet communication. The existing standards or tests, that 
ECtHR applies when assessing issues of somehow questionable speech, were tailor-made in 
the ongoing course of cases. Here the narrative will consist of showing how the Court can 
regulate and limit the freedom of expression, what kind of requirements apply to make the 
restriction justifiable and, most importantly, how these rules were represented in the actual 
case law. One particular case deserves some extra attention - Jersild v. Denmark. It at the 
same moment encompasses the majority of the most prominent preceding ECtHR decisions, 
gives a landmark for more than four dozens of succeeding trials
6
 and is of a similar essence as 
the main lawsuit of the entire thesis. 
With regard to the topic of this paper, liability of media agents (but not necessarily a classic 
media) for “authorless” remarks made online, the most suitable patterns of ECtHR logics 
would be litigations of hate speech incidents or incitement to violence and defamation. Norms 
of hate speech treatment in this context will be considered of higher importance, hence the 
main case of the subsequent analysis - Delfi AS v. Estonia - concerns primarily anonymous 
hate speech. Then infringement of reputation rights of others: it can take many shapes, 
starting with commercial reputation and criticism of public figures and politicians to 
maintaining authority of the judiciary.
7
 Without getting into myriads of cases resembling each 
other, because that then would require a separate volume for each type of reputational right, 




 Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, “Protecting the Right to Freedom of Expression under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. A handbook for legal practitioners.” Council of Europe (2017): p. 11. Available 
on: https://rm.coe.int/handbook-freedom-of-expression-eng/1680732814. Accessed: March 28, 2018. 
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this subchapter will provide a general overview of ECtHR standards for defamatory 
statements. That will be necessary in forecasting probable outcomes and providing 
recommendations, if some of this rights happen to be demeaned by merciless online 
commentators. 
2.1. Justifiable limitations of the freedom of expression 
The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights expressly states the values and 
principles that the Convention stands for: fundamental freedoms of people which are 
necessary for effective functioning of a democratic political system.
8
 Freedom of expression, 
among other freedoms, is not only important as an independent right, but also has a central 
role in the protection of other rights and freedoms under the Convention. Without a free 
speech protected by autonomous and impartial judiciary there cannot be a democratic country, 
there cannot be a democracy.
9
 For several times the ECtHR has also underlined the role of 
free press in a democratic society and freedom of expression in general. In case Lingens v. 
Austria honourable Court for the first time formulated that the right to voice one’s opinions, 
beliefs and concerns is one of the adamant principles that makes modern-day community a 
democratic one: 
[F]reedom of expression … constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual’s self-fulfillment.10 
It once again shows that Strasbourg judges understand and hold free speech in high esteem. 
Later on this statement was reiterated and reaffirmed in cases of similar nature concerning 
Article 10, such as Şener v. Turkey11, Thoma v. Luxembourg12 and others.13 The press, as part 
of freedom of expression, also was not forgotten by the ECtHR - according to the Court it 
“plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law.”14 The article 10 of the 
Convention is divided into two parts. The first one establishes protected rights more precisely: 
the right to freedom of expression must also comprise the freedom to hold opinions and to 
obtain and transmit information or ideas; and that to be without unjust interference of public 
                                               
8
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: p. 5. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed: March 28, 2018.  
9
 Bychawska-Siniarska, “Freedom of Expression under the ECHR.” p. 11.   
10
 Lingens v. Austria, no. 9815/82, para. 41, ECHR 1986. Available on: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
57523. 
11
 Şener v. Turkey, no. 26680/95, para. 39, ECHR 2000. Available on: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
58753. 
12
 Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, para. 43, ECHR 2001. Available on: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59363.  
13
 Bychawska-Siniarska, “Freedom of Expression under the ECHR.” p. 11. 
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 Simultaneously, this right guaranteed by the article may itself clash with other 
fundamental right protected under the Convention, such as the right to fair trial or to respect 
of private life. Article’s second part governs justifiable reasons to interfere with or restrict 
one’s freedom of expression - and the majority of disputes arises when the national 
government seeks to protect values and interests from that very part.  
The three-part test that the Court goes through each and every time is enshrined into part 2 of 
the Article 10. At first, the interference of authorities with exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression shall be prescribed by national law. For instance, in case of a person convicted for 
hate speech, the very crime of hate speech must be embodied into national penal or civil code, 
adopted by the national parliament. As a general rule of thumb, whatever sanction is applied 
towards one’s freedom of speech, it has to have grounds in written and public legal 
provisions. Talking about the rules of common law culture or principles of public 
international law, there were only very few cases when the Court relied
16
 on them as on a 
rightful ground for interference; mainly because granting legitimacy for any restriction in a 
democratic world requires such verification steps as parliamentary debates and open 
elections.
17
 For the first time in ECtHR history this statement appears in the judgment of case 
The Sunday Times v. UK case. Quite lengthy, but since every piece of that tenet expresses the 
position of the Court for years ahead, it is worth to show the complete wording:  
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given 
case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if 
need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those 
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this 
to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train 
excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. 
Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser 
extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice.
18
 
Once this step is done, interference with one’s right to exercise freedom of expression shall 
pursue one of the legitimate aims mentioned into second paragraph of the Article 10. Their 
list is exhaustive and is limited to the following: national security, territorial integrity, public 
safety, prevention of crime and disorder, protection of health, morals, reputation and rights of 
others, preventing the disclosure of confidential information and maintaining the authority 
                                               
15
 Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, para. 1. 
16
 Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, no. 10890/84, para. 65-67, ECHR 1990. Available on: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57623; Autronic AG and v. Switzerland, no. 12726/87, para. 51, ECHR 
1990. Available on: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57630. 
17
 Bychawska-Siniarska, “Freedom of Expression under the ECHR.” p. 39. 
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and impartiality of the judicature.
19
 Hence, whenever national court is urged by a prosecutor 
or a claimant to enforce a legal provision that in a certain way limits the freedom to express, 
the court has duty to clearly identify interests, rights or values protected by this provision. 
Consequently, it has to examine whether the above-mentioned interest or value falls within 
the scope of Article 10.2. And only in case the answer to that question is positive, court may 
proceed with the imposition of sanctions and penalties.
20
 A short theoretical example: if 
newspaper article damages someone’s dignity and honour, then national court will declare 
protection of reputation and rights of others as a legitimate aim for interference. Or supposing 
that said tabloid publishes materials that critically illuminate some ongoing trial of great 
public interest. In that case this newspaper may face a confiscation of the whole production 
unit. It will be legitimate on the basis of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary, supposing that too harsh article may obstruct the justice.  
Finally, the restriction to the freedom of expression has to be necessary in a democratic 
society, and that is what the ECtHR analyses at last. It is very similar to the legal 
proportionality test - whether the goal is proportionate to the sanction applied to achieve that 
goal? And whether the same effect is achievable by less repressing means? For the supreme 
goal of the restriction to be in harmony with the sanction there shall exists pressing social 
need, a notion first formulated in case Observer and Guardian v. UK: “[t]he adjective 
‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 …  implies the existence of a ’pressing 
social need.’”21 
The question of how the ECtHR treats the freedom of speech and arising academic debates 
are extremely heated among scholars Yet there is one observation they all agree with: 
honourable Court in Strasbourg has always been struggling to balance out prevention of 
unlawful speech and protection of freedom of expression, as point out researcher Antoine 
Buyse from the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights. This issue lacks consensus among the 
Court and academia the most, and also among judges themselves, considering the amount of 
dissenting opinions in Article 10 related cases.
22
 While most of the scholars in this area agree 
that there shall exist a definite equilibrium between freedom of expression and socially 
justified restrictions, zealous advocates of the free speech speak against the conventional 
wisdom. Heli Askola from the Monash University insists that it is naive to suppose that the 
                                               
19
 Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, para. 2. 
20
 Bychawska-Siniarska, “Freedom of Expression under the ECHR.” p. 43. 
21
 Observer and Guardian v. The United Kingdom, no. 13585/88, para. 59(c), ECHR 1991. Available on: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705.   
22
 Antoine Buyse. “Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence and Free Speech.” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 63, no. 2 (2014): pp. 497–500, 502. doi:10.1017/S0020589314000104. 
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mere fact of prosecution or conviction for an unlawful speech will one day suddenly remove 
all the hatred from public discussions and the problem needs to be solved at its origin.
23
 This 
view, however, no matter how theoretically attractive it is, looks as excessively radical and 
disregarding deficiencies of the reality.  
2.3. Jersild v. Denmark: drawing a parallel with Delfi 
Long before the first lawsuits regarding liability of Internet intermediaries were brought 
before the Strasbourg Court, quite an intriguing case had captured the attention of 
jurisprudence professionals and researchers in the year of 1995. It would be an interesting 
challenge - to draw an analogy between two cases of different nature, press coverage and 
anonymous comments, and a substantial time gap of 20 years between them. Cases Jersild v. 
Denmark and Delfi AS v. Estonia have one very similar trait - responsibility for the 
statements of third persons. Differences and similarities of these two cases will be discussed 
further on, in order to find out whether a direct analogy can be drawn between them.  
In short, producers of the popular Danish television programme wanted to create a 
documentary film about recently founded nationalistic group of young people with utmost 
radical views on immigration, “The Greenjackets”. For that purpose, three members of 
Greenjackets group were invited for an interview. During the conversation between the host 
and the guests, all three members of the extremist movement have made a few spiteful and 
offensive remarks towards non-Danish population of Denmark, mainly black-coloured 
immigrants from the African continent. The clearest and, probably, the most derogative 
example of their words would be a statement that “[a] nigger is not a human being, it’s an 
animal, that goes for all the other foreign workers as well, Turks, Yugoslavs and whatever 
they are called”24 (the exact wording of Greenjacket speech included for purely scientific 
reasons and reader’s familiarization with the matter; author of this paper neither wishes to 
promote such views, nor agrees with). Following the documentary appearance on Danish 
television, a complaint was filed to the Minister of Justice; the initiated investigation resulted 
in a criminal proceedings under the instruction of Public Prosecutor. Besides the fact that 
three interviewed Greenjackets were convicted later on, for different offences, including hate 
speech, the City Court of Copenhagen has also imposed a monetary fine on TV host Mr. 
                                               
23
 Heli Askola. “Taking the Bait? Lessons from a Hate Speech Prosecution.” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 30, no. 1 (2015): p. 71. doi:10.1017/cls.2014.15. 
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Jersild and his editorial supervisor Mr. Jensen, with an alternative of imprisonment for five 
successive days. 
The court has motivated its logic in a way that Mr. Jersild (case applicant) first, “had himself 
taken the initiative of making the television programme”25 and second, “had been well aware 
in advance that discriminatory statements of a racist nature were likely to be made during the 
interview.”26 For the court it meant that the journalist himself incited interviewees to voice 
their xenophobic commentary and by not providing objective counterbalancing views in the 
programme, he has violated the national Penal Code.
27
 In an ensuing series of appeals, first to 
the High Court of Eastern Denmark and then to the Supreme Court, did not succeed as the 
argumentation of Danish judges remained unchanged: in this particular case public interest in 
protection against racial discrimination prevails over the interest in freedom of expression. 
Additionally, it was emphasized that the question of disputed measures conformity with the 
Convention (Article 10, in particular) was not raised during the trial.
28
 By doing that court 
arbitrarily liberated itself from observing ECtHR standards. At the end it that resulted in 
applicant’s victory.  
The Strasbourg court did overrule the verdict of the Supreme Court of Denmark, reaching 
certain conclusions, that may appear helpful for one wishing to critically assess the problem 
of liability of intermediaries for third-party content in Europe. Similarly to the Delfi AS. v 
Estonia
29
, out of the criterias to be met in order to justify interference with the freedom of 
expression, applicant contested the necessity of taken measures in a democratic society (in 
Delfi it was also claimed that the interference is not prescribed by law,
30
 whereas here it was 
not questioned). The main line of  Court’s reasoning consisted of the following observations. 
At first the Court noted that the journalist himself did not express any of the derogatory 
remarks, but merely provided a platform for others to do so as a representative of a television 
programme. That fact obliges the Court to examine necessity of journalist’s conviction within 
the frames of established standards of treatment of the press,
31
 using case law as a reference 
point. While the freedom of expression by itself plays a vital role in forming a healthy society, 
it has even greater significance for the press. Just as the media sharks shall not go beyond the 
limit of what constitutes “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, they have a duty 
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As the Court once acknowledged during proceedings of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, in 
the eyes of the law media industry enjoys certain extent of freedom. And if taken with all due 
responsibility, it also may involve potential resort to the exaggeration or provocation.
33
 As 
seen from the final decision, case of Jersild was not exempt from this principle. This approach 
towards the media realm was lately reaffirmed in next ECtHR decisions
34
 and explained in 
detail by legal scholars.
35
 The Court is undoubtedly aware of all the negative effects resulting 
from either censorship, or excessively harsh regulation of the freedom of the media.
36
 For 
instance, in any case when the disputed expression cannot be qualified as an incitement to 
violence, authorities cannot “restrict the right of the public to be informed”37 by imposing 
criminal liability on the press. 
It is quite evident that in the last two decades the ECtHR was, if not promoter, but certainly a 
strong advocate of the free speech, especially with regard to the media. Yet, those standards 
were surprisingly ignored in the Delfi AS v. Estonia proceedings; to what extent exactly - will 
be shown in the upcoming chapters.  
3. THE US APPROACH TOWARDS THE ANONYMOUS SPEECH  
In order to find different perspective of how anonymous speech can be handled, apart from 
the continental-European approach, one can consider legal views from another part of the 
Atlantics. Up until now ECtHR did not review cases where claimant was somehow repressed 
by authorities for his unwillingness to disclose anonymous authors on the Internet, but did 
imposed direct liability on Internet intermediary just recently in Delfi AS v. Estonia. The 
common law culture of United States offers something that differs quite a lot from what 
ordinary European lawyer would expect. This section that is dedicated to the legal ecosystem, 
different from the European one, suggests a nothing but a simple comparison between two. 
However, both the ECtHR and American legal order abide by similar precedent rules, making 
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it possible to compare absolutely different, at first glance, systems. Obviously, since the US 
Code plays no role in the decision-making process of ECtHR, there is no room for harshly 
critical comments based on its opposition to the European legislation. However, a 
comparative element always was an excellent tool for those who strive the progress of legal 
thought on their own land. Ideas represented in this chapter will be merely used to assume 
theories of ‘what if’, without zealously rushing to the reckless conclusions on how European 
nations shall change their ‘deluded’ mind.  
Before examining opinions of the notable American jurists, it is vital to start with outlining 
the very difference between responsibility of Internet intermediaries under European legal 
traditions and those of the US culture. Section 230(c)(1) of the Part V of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, commonly referred as Communications Decency Act, 
contains the following statement:  
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
38
 
These words unambiguously establish a statewide immunity to any cause of action that allows 
to hold Internet service providers accountable for content generated by third-parties. From the 
judicial point of view, this section of US Code disallows national courts to review claims that 
would otherwise treat Internet service providers as the actual publishers of the information. In 
other words, legal actions that seek to make service provider liable for its editorial policies, 
including those that favour anonymous comments, are completely prohibited and will not pass 
relevant criterias.
39
 This thorough description of how exactly Telecommunications Act will 
affect online service providers and those who seek justice for their slandered reputation 
appeared for the first time in the landmark proceedings of Zeran v. America Online, at the 
first stage of appeal.  
In brief, an anonymous user of the America Online posted defamatory and untrue information 
on behalf of Mr. Zeran and using his phone number. Zeran had started to receive threatening 
calls and tried to sue America Online as information publisher, because in his view AOL did 
not act promptly to resolve this difficult situation; multiple courts consistently delivered 
verdicts in favour of AOL, the Internet intermediary. And there was no surprise for any legal 
observer. Back in 1996 when the Communications Act was amended, in so-called preamble to 
the section 230, Congress firmly noted that rapidly evolving array of Internet and other 
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computer services that offers the US citizen massive opportunities for political debate, 
cultural enrichment and intellectual development
40
 shall be promoted, by preserving “the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet ... unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation.”41 Argumentation deducted from Zeran case of became then a 
reference point for numerous further decisions, owing to the common law traditions of the 
United States. Following cases only adhered to the recognized doctrine, such as in Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com or in Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings LLC:  
Even having notice that users may be using its site to make discriminatory statements 
is not sufficient to invade … [online service provider’s] immunity;42 and [The 
Communications Decency Act
43
] bars claims lodged against website operators for 
their editorial functions, such as the posting of comments concerning third-party posts, 
so long as those comments are not themselves actionable.
44
 
Indeed, such a modern, technology friendly and vibrant approach of US legislature faced a 
warm welcome in academic world. For example, professor of Yale Law School, Jack M. 
Balkin, in his article regarding the future of freedom of expression in a digital environment 
expressed the opinion that even if exemption from liability granted by the section 230 may be 
sometimes overprotective, it is still a masterful jewel of American legislation. Because 
entrepreneurs have been freed from the burden of liability, they were able to create vast 
amount of various programmes, applications and services that bring comfort and pleasure in 
people’s everyday life.45 Usually it is quite difficult to identify someone on the Internet in 
order to bring a lawsuit, simply because this someone’s speech is anonymous or he resides 
outside the country of damaged party. These frequent obstacles motivate one to sue online 
intermediary, where the defamatory statement appeared, which is far easier. Apart from that, 
financial position of a company is often better off in comparison to that of a private 
individual. That would be another incentive to overlook factual offender and sue directly the 
service provider,
46
 which is highly undesirable for the reasons mentioned before.  
Additionally, by imposing liability of intermediaries one does foster the concept of collateral 
censorship - when the constant fear of potential liability urges service provider to limit or 
completely disallow third party content. Not only that kind of a grim reality would hinder 
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civic engagement, public debate and so on, but also it would be an obstruction to the 
technological advancement. If the prospective developer cherishes the idea of creating 
popular online platform, most likely he will think twice and thrice, assuming all the litigation 
risks that may arise out of the user-generated texts.
47
 On a long run additional business risks 
always lead to the slower development
48
 of that particular sector; which is of course harmful 
for the economy and overall population wellbeing. Inevitable threat of liability would play a 
role of the sword of Damocles, discouraging many enthusiasts from entering the market and 
contributing the progress.  
These postulates of Congress were also commented in appellate judgment of the 
aforementioned case Zeran v. America Online, by the Chief Judge Wilkinson. He mentions, in 
particular, that Congress did realise the danger that delict lawsuits impose on freedom of 
expression in the flourishing era of Internet. Holding service providers liable for the 
communications of third parties meant for the Congress another obsessive policy of speech 
control.
49
 Further on Judge Wilkinson points out that nothing in these words obstructs justice 
for the actual culprits, authors of defamatory statements - but they and only they shall feel the 
full weight of that justice. Imposing liability on intermediaries would beyond doubt have a 
chilling effect on other computer-related enterprises.
50
 Moreover, it would be simply 
unachievable for service providers to monitor myriads of user publications and examine them 
for potential problems. Encountered with the probable liability for each and every message 
posted throughout its servers, web medium would have significant incentive to either brutally 
restrict user communication or discard it entirely.
51
 Great unity among legislative and judicial 
branches of US government, accompanied by the warm welcome of academic world, has 
created some kind of an unshakable paradigm that serves for the sake of free speech. As a 
result Americans have what they have - a truly marvelous safe haven for any information 
distributor or aggregator, that allows public discourse; but at the same time - land of 
uncertainty for individuals or organizations whose good name may fell victim to an 
anonymous wrongdoing.  
On the other hand, not all the jurists from the United States completely agree and hail current 
state of affairs. Law professor Bryan H. Choi in his essay “The Anonymous Internet” 
                                               
47
 Ibid, p. 435-436 
48
 Investopedia - Financial Dictionary. “Business Risk.” Available on: 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/businessrisk.asp.  Accessed: April 15, 2018. 
49
 Daniel J. Solove. The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 152. 
50
 Raymond S. R. Ku. Cyberspace Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016), p. 
221. 
51
 Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327. 
19 
 
underlines the imperfections of the existing dogma and tries to discuss a possible trade-off 
between rights of Internet service providers and individual’s privacy. Back in the day, 
immunity granted by the section 230 was a driving force of Internet expansion, that brought it 
to our daily routine. But now, when Internet has reached its maturity stage (at least, the 
majority thinks it is), controlling  legislation became old not only in terms of age, but also in 
terms of societal usefulness. First moment that strikes the eye is a huge disparity between 
offline liability and online liability: while the classic publishers and distributors of printed 
periodicals must abide by specific rules that regulate defamatory speech, their online vis-à-vis 
are nearly exempt from any kind of liability. Dissemination of ghoulish remarks becomes way 
too easily achievable. Simultaneously, attempts to purge the offensive comments are doomed 
to failure most of the time.
52
  
Then again, to remain within a certain degree of objectivity, prof. Choi agrees that despite 
pleas for enhancement, there is no clear answer on whether immunity given by section 230 
has reached the point, when it does more harm that benefit. Even though tightened criterias 
for liability exemption would “certainly aid in deterring defamation and sanitizing the 
Internet”53, there are serious doubts about financial and technical capabilities of information 
operators. And highly likely that being unable to withstand new costs, Internet intermediaries 
will sooner or later engage into practices of collateral censorship, already mentioned before.
54
 
Which in its turn will negatively affect online environment in whole, disturbing freedom of 
thought exchange.  
While the previous speakers, indeed, demonstrated a lot of hospitality to the immunity of the 
Internet service providers, they did not discuss the challenge of imposition of liability on 
actual perpetrators via different means of unmasking individual anonymity. However, 
American jurist Ethan B. Siler in his commentary for the Wake Forest Law Review did rise 
rise that question. At first he flags that even considering the fact that online spread 
anonymous speech enjoys the protection of the famous First Amendment,
55
 some specific 
versions of it do not; libelous statements would be the simplest example that comes to one’s 
mind.
56
 The first perception of people being defenceless before the defamatory speech, that 
may come after analysing Telecommunications Act exclusively, is far from reality  - in the 
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United States defamation laws are respected in a full manner. Due to the federal legislation 
inspected in previous paragraphs, it is just the intermediaries who are mainly exempt from 
effects of these laws; slanderers are not.
57
  
Those who seek reimbursement for their damaged reputation have to sue the anonymous 
author directly; it is evident that the author must be at first identified or the whole claim 
makes no sense. In order to do so, potential applicant, after submitting his claim, must request 
a subpoena duces tecum
58
 or a court order that would oblige Internet service provider to 
disclose personality of the anonymous speaker.
59
 But before authorizing such a decree, the 
court has to find a balance between one’s right to express his concerns anonymously and 
another’s right to be safe from the libelous speech.60 Quick note: that challenging task 
immediately remind one of the traditions of European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, 
where so many time judges were asked to strike a balance between two conflicting 
fundamental rights - freedom of expression and respect for private life, for example, as it is 
directly related to the topic of discussion. American courts try to balance out two notions as 
serious as their European colleagues. In case subpoenas are granted to easily, it would 
immediately give rise to the chilling effect, scaring away online authors from writing any kind 
of critical comments out of fear of facing horrendous legal expenses.
61
 It is not quite difficult 
to assume what fatal effects such practices would have on a free speech within a country.  
On the other hand, absolute reluctance to issue mentioned subpoenas on the basis of 
inadequate evidence will lead to the total disrespect of individual’s reputation and neglect of 
one’s right to protect his good name. Gathering a sufficient proof will become too costly for 
the majority, deterring people from bringing defamation claims and seeking justice.
62
 And 
that is besides complete moral degradation of the society as a whole., because uncontrolled 
defamation on the Internet will provide infinite opportunities for dishonest businessmen to 
badmouth their market rivals. If one wishes to continue this grim chain of logic, this potential 
situation will result in substantial number of misled customers and closure of decent 
companies. In either event, it is up to the court to decide, which fundamental rights prevails 
over another, in each particular case, as long as there is no decision of the US Supreme Court 
                                               
57
 Ibid, p. 193. 
58
 Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (2014). “Subpoena duces tecum.” 
59
 Mallory Allen. “Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the Bar for Disclosure of 
Online Speakers.” Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 7 , no. 2 (2011): p. 80. Available on: 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1066/7WJLTA75.pdf;sequence=4. 
Accessed: 22 April, 2018. 
60
 Siler. “Unmasking Internet Anonymity.” p. 193. 
61





that would bound courts of state jurisdiction. Although there are several rationales for 
granting subpoenas that derive from the case-law,
63
 United States lack nationwide standard 
(both judge-made and black letter law) that could move all decisions in the same direction. 
Furthermore, written law in this regard is not a common practice even at the state level.
64
 
Continuing with the critical discussion on whether the right to remain anonymous is that 
essential, it would be fair to mention following moment. Not so long ago some scholars in the 
US (modern cradle of a free speech, who would have thought!) had expressed views, that 
today would be considered rather regressive, radical and exceptionally obsolete than simply 
conservative. At the beginning of 21st century, when the Internet was expanding for the 
masses, there were some beliefs that anonymous speech rather lowers the quality of important 
public discussions than enhances it - due to lack of credence and accountability.
65
 Remaining 
unknown to the audience, potential speaker removes all the chains of responsibility for his 
discourse - and immediately loses trust of the public.
66
 Human psychological mechanisms 
work in a very specific way: insufficient or completely missing information about the person 
we listen to makes it difficult to learn on the experience of previous listeners, evaluate 
person’s reputation, credibility of his words. On the subconscious level of human brain, 
impossibility to inspect the speaker and his background diminishes the degree of trust he is 
granted with.
67
 Abovementioned views, however, have never gained widespread popularity in 
both academic and professional circles and now are almost forgotten, fortunately for the 
advocates of anonymity and anonymous writers themselves.  
While the American system offers different approach from the European one, it does not 
mean that continental culture of law cannot progress to the heights of its US counterpart, in 
terms of freedom of expression. Especially in the age of evolving computer technologies, that 
today are playing far more important roles than yesterday.  
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4. ECONOMIC HARM TO THE MEDIA AS A RESULT OF INTERMEDIARY 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The effect of unbound or badly managed Internet intermediaries liability would be, apart from 
the  purely societal loss, permanent financial losses by mass media companies and operators. 
If the amount of influential politicians and business moguls successfully suing media outlets 
increases in geometric progression, news portals and similar service providers will very 
quickly understand that even fair and objective criticism will lead to their liquidation. Rich 
variety of fines, damages and compensations will simply leave them without livelihood. And 
society that has allowed such situation to happen (by electing authoritarian politicians, who in 
their turn appoint ultra conservative judiciaries) will not see any kind of independent press or 
public activism for a considerable period of time. Consequently, absence of an open debate 
will create a fertile soil for the spread of corruption, misuse of public funds and absolute 
permissiveness of powers that be.
68
 What is more, overall Internet penetration across the 
country and popularity of the social media are negatively correlated with corruption indices, 
especially in parts of the world where the freedom of press is severely restrained.
69
 
Different Internet media editions have different revenue models to support their activity. It 
would be valuable to analyse the variety of business models in relation to their deficiency 
towards mismanaged legal regime for liability of intermediaries, in order to understand. In 
other words, in case media portals are required to strictly monitor each and every activity of 
their readers, what types of commercialization would be the most and the least vulnerable.  
According to the methodology of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
there are four main types, with their own subclasses, of revenue models for Internet 
intermediaries. Media, among them, use these strategies to achieve financial sustainability and 
cover their basic costs, such as rent of working premises and staff salaries. 
4.1. Potential influence by business model type 
4.1.1. Advertising model 
First model is a quite common technique for most media outlets and is their primary source of 
income. It is called advertising model. It allows, say, online newspaper to provide services 
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and create content at no cost for its readers, whereas expenses and profits are covered by the 
advertisers. Apart from the very basic placement of banners, this method also includes 
electronic mail advertising for those users who did provide their address and selling user data 
- anonymous and not.
70
 Clearly, this original business model is proven to be the most 
effective way of financing activities of large and popular media undertakings. However, 
among non-profit organisations or public forums such methods are either inefficient or stand 
against organisations policy. Possibility for active communication among users and 
expressing one’s views on a particular topic is one of the ways of audience retention; 
interested person will spend more time on a portal, hence, increasing chances to be 
successfully affected by sponsored content.
71
 If the regulation of intermediaries liability is 
such an extensive burden for the media outlet, that it is more rational to simply close the 
comments section rather than monitor and moderate it, amount of time average user spends on 
the webpage will drop. It is hard to predict to what extent, but persons who do not hesitate 
engage into online discussions with people they barely know, usually are also prone to pay 
more attention to flashing ads and promotional emails.
72
 
4.1.2. Fee-based model 
The second business model, also widely popular in media circles, utilizes fee-based approach. 
Popularized by the leading business and financial newspapers, such as The Economist, Wall 
Street Journal and Financial Times, it allows users to choose either free, but content-restricted 
version of the newspaper (via paywall
73
) or buy a monthly subscription for unlimited access 
to the articles, surveys and interviews .It also includes pay-per-item model, when instead of 
subscribing to the whole newspaper, user buys one single article.
74
 Subscription obviously 
requires users to register and share portion of their personal data, including credit card number 
and name. In this case, when anonymity or use of fake accounts is hardly possible, the 
liability most likely to fall on the actual author of illicit commentaries, rather than the media 
portal. This approach gives editorial board an opportunity to effectively diminish risks related 
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to defamation or hate speech lawsuits. It is worth to mention, from the commercial 
perspective, that such revenue model works only for media with certain degree of popularity, 
quality and trustworthiness. It also would be quite unwise to write off the human perception 
of prestige: a lot of people feel “important” while they are flicking through a copy of The 
Financial Times with a cup of sugarless espresso nearby. Whereas it successfully functions 
for a magazine of The Economist size, local town newspaper will barely survive under these 
conditions. 
5.1.3. Brokerage model 
The brokerage model is another type of commercialization for Internet intermediary, via 
commission on transactions or membership fees. It mainly exists for the purposes of 
electronic commerce and is hard to imagine serving needs of the media.
75
 However, many 
service and product aggregators, such as hotel reservation website Booking.com or various 
electronic eBay-like shops practice system of customer reviews, that also should be treated as 
opportunity to raise one’s voice, including critical remarks about the quality of provided 
service or delivered goods. Even though commission-based model is doubtfully applicable in 
the world of regular media, it  cannot be absolutely thrown overboard - because in the world 
of advancing technology customer reviews became a notable part of freedom of expression. 
4.1.4. Voluntary donations model 
As an addition, the model of voluntary contributions exists, where loyalty of users plays the 
supreme role. Donations is not a standard example of revenue model, as it neither guarantees 
stable cash inflow, nor that it will cover at least operating costs. It has gained its popularity 
from the massive spread of blogging culture; citizen journalist has found a way to get 
financial aid to support their activities.
76
 Even though donations are made from identifiable 
user-accounts with the real personal data, comment section, if website has such, usually 
requires no or very simple registration procedure - with no possibility to detect commenter. 
Non-profit organisations and citizen journalists, who may use donation model, are usually 
very limited in finances, in comparison with large media corporations and even local town 
magazine. Providing possibility for users to leave anonymous responses puts them at risk of 
potential claims. If the legal practice regarding liability of intermediaries is unreasonably 
harsh to the latter, it may become dangerous to leave comment section unmoderated. Whereas 
closure of it may have a discouraging effect on that part of audience who would like to 
contribute money in exchange for a public platform for discussions.  
                                               
75
 Ibid, p. 34. 
76
 Ibid, p. 34. 
25 
 
4.2. Positive correlation between press freedom and economic development 
Liability of the Internet service providers and the effects it has on the financial well-being of a 
particular media company involves an analysis of a relatively small sector of the national 
economy, even in highly developed countries.
77
 But this is not where the story ends. First 
published in Journal of Media Economics, a recent study by the Pakistani economists depicts 
a visible correlation between liberal attitude towards media freedoms and economic prosperity 
of the country. Data of the recorded economic growth in sample countries (plus the amount of 
foreign direct investments) on one hand, together with the indices of press freedom in those 
countries on another, shows, that there is reciprocal positive effect between them.
78
 In other 
words, free and independent media industry fosters economic development of the country.  
Simply because foreign investors and to-be businessmen are aware of the real state of affairs 
within a country, they can plan and make their commercial decisions accordingly, at the same 
time avoiding great amount of risks that usually comes with the lack of market knowledge. 
And vice versa, inflow of oversea funds and overall welfare of the population creates 
favourable environment for independent journalists, reporters and other fact-finders, as local 
authorities adopt media friendly policies
79
 in an attempt to strengthen the trust of investors 
and trade partners. All of the above indicates that freedom of the press is an essential 
ingredient of a long-run economic growth.
80
 
Again, it is important to preserve a realistically sober attitude: nobody should expect soaring 
wages and return on the capital just from the fact that media industry in a particular country 
breathes free. It is one component out of the mass, that are necessary for sound economy. A 
stable physical integrity of anyone on the planet requires numerous preconditions, not just one 
or two. A person can quit smoking, but if his or her diet consists mostly of the McDonald’s-
like food, well, probably person’s health will look questionable. Those observations in any 
manner are not undermining the fact that judges in Strasbourg court are there to address 
questions of the law, not economics. However, such significant benefits of freedom of 
expression cannot be just thrown overboard as something not essential or unconnected to 
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reality. If it happens in future, that would be the greatest ignorance of our time. But that is of 
course an unlikely and highly pessimistic assumption.   
5. LIABILITY OF INTERMEDIARIES IN RECENT CASE LAW 
The story behind the problem of this thesis begins in 2015 when Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR had delivered a paramount verdict in case Delfi AS v. Estonia, that held Baltic news 
website liable for anonymous third-party comments containing hate speech. This decision was 
first of its kind, establishing precedence power over future proceedings of similar nature - 
liability of Internet intermediaries in context of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Up until now there are only three adjudicated disputes of that matter: Delfi AS v. Estonia, as 
well as MTE v. Hungary and Pihl v. Sweden. Even though in both cases succeeding Delfi, 
outcome resulted in favour of the intermediaries, they have followed the Delfi pattern and 
lacked detailed legal analysis.  
Hence, the case establishing precedence rule shall be subject to the analysis. It is highly 
possible that in light of the preceding observations a new outlook on the treatment of 
intermediary liability in the web may appear; or at least a set of theoretical proposals. First in 
this chapter, as one most likely expects, research will scrutinise Delfi case, focusing on a 
special test created for this very lawsuit. Then the narrative will shift to the critical assessment 
of the outcome of Delfi trial, by looking at the opinions of respected academics, lawyers and 
also “dissident” judges, who have been present at the moment when Delfi verdict was 
announced. 
5.1. Delfi AS v. Estonia 
5.1.1. Background of the case 
Delfi, the applicant, is an online media portal, that publishes news articles on its website and 
allow readers to participate in a public discussion, posting both registered and anonymous 
comments. For the general public Delfi’s comment section is notoriously known for the 
unrestrained and notably vulgar lexicon of its participants. Notwithstanding the issue of 
dubious reputation, Delfi has implemented a notice-and-take-down system for its users, which 
allowed basically any reader, even not registered, to flag a particular comment as insult, 
mockery or incitement to hatred or violence. Flagged message would be then inspected by 
moderation officer. Additionally, Delfi had an autonomous system that reacts on specific 
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triggers - such as obscene words and collocations.
81
 Back in the year 2006 journalists of Delfi 
have published critical article about transportation company SLK that broke the natural ice 
roads between Estonian mainland and some small islands. During winter colds frozen surface 
of the sea is allowed for public usage as a road; whereas SLK, providing ferry service, 
benefits on conveyance of people from the mainland to islands and back. As usual, comments 
section was open for readers to express their view about the situation reported in article. 
Taking into account quite selfishly outrageous actions of SLK (from the ordinary people 
perspective) and common practices among commentators, it was not a big surprise that out of 
the 185 comments in total, about couple of dozens of them were addressing threats and 
offensive language personally to the company owner. Six week after  the appearance of 
hateful comments, lawyers of the company owner requested Delfi to remove them and 
claimed monetary compensation for moral harm. Although comments were removed on the 
very day of request, Delfi rejected to pay out compensation.
82
  
Following that refusal, company owner brought a lawsuit to the Harju County Court against 
said media portal. The first instance court dismissed this claim, arguing that Delfi does not 
bear liability for comment under the local Information Society Services Act, which is a mere 
incorporation of the European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce into Estonian legal 
system. In its paragraphs dedicated to the definition of ‘restricted liability’ (official meaning 
of the word ‘limited’ in this particular Act) the Information Society Services Act provides the 
following wording on when and under what conditions notion of restricted liability applies.  
First, when a service consists of the mere transmission of information provided by a recipient 
of the service into a publicly available data, or the provision of access to a public data 
communication network, the service provider does not bear liability for the information 
transmitted, provided that he does not interfere with the transmission process by modifying 
information or selecting its receivers.
83
 Next, the service provider is also not liable for storing 
automatic and temporary information under the same conditions. In case executive or judicial 
authorities have issued a removal order for this particular information, service provider avoids 
liability when he has responded to that order without delay.
84
 At last the service provider has 
no responsibility over the information stored at the deliberate and acknowledged request of 
service recipient, knowing the fact that “provider does not have actual knowledge of the 
contents of the information and … is not aware of facts … from which the illegal activity … 
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is apparent.” In all events of storing the information that happens to be illegal and infringes 
third party rights, service provider is also free from liability, if he acts promptly when 




However, victorious media portal was defeated in a set of subsequent appeal hearings. In a 
first one by the owner of ferry business, when Tallinn Court of Appeal held that the court of 
first instance had mistaken in its judgment and erroneously relied on Information Society 
Services Act (replication of e-commerce Directive) instead of Obligations Act, which would 
have protected honour and dignity of company owner.
86
 Case then returned back to the Harju 
County Court and got a decision in favour of the company owner. At last, following an appeal 
submitted by Delfi’s lawyers, case had reached the doorstep of the apex of Estonian judicial 
system - the Supreme Court. The last instance court had supported and endorsed the ruling of 
the previous one; with a slightly modified argumentation, yet the same essence. 
5.1.2. Court’s criteria 
The matter of the dispute between parties to the case was not whether the Estonian state 
pursued a legitimate aim when imposing sanctions on Delfi, because applicant at the very 
beginning agreed on the inappropriate and hateful  nature of the comments and removed them. 
But it was the proportionality of applied measure and its necessity in democratic society, 
which the applicant had questioned. Additionally, the applicant claimed that restriction of his 
right to freedom of expression was simply not prescribed by national law, as there was no 
legislation or case-law that prescribes judge to interpret an intermediary as a publisher of 
information, that intermediary was unaware of before the notice. Just the opposite, the 
applicable law to this situation, which includes EU Directive, Estonian Act and Council of 
Europe Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, does not allow imposition 
of liability on Internet intermediaries for user-generated content.
87
 
Members of the Grand Chamber had fully agreed on the aspects of the case that their 
colleagues from the ordinary Chamber have found crucial for their legal analysis. Namely, 
four factors played were the leading ones: the context of the disputed comments, the measures 
applied by Delfi administration in order to avert or remove humiliating messages, possibility 
of the alternative to hold accountable the actual commentators instead of media outlet, and the 
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consequences of the proceedings at national level for the applicant company.
88
 According to 
the Court those four moments were absolutely necessary for the accurate “assessment of the 
proportionality of the interference in issue within the scope of the Court’s examination,”89 i.e. 
the necessity of the domestic measures in a democratic society.  
The first out of four aspects, nature of the commentaries, created almost no dispute at all, 
because all parties to the conflict agreed on the spirit of the comments being excessively 
vulgar and inciting hatred or violence against very specific person: Delfi had promptly deleted 
them from its website after becoming aware of the problem, Estonian courts had clearly 
established their degrading essence to the human dignity and ECtHR had agreed with all 
arguments in this regard.
90
 However, the Supreme Court of Estonia and lately the ECtHR had 
also considered valid the following: 
[I]n the comment environment, the applicant company actively called for comments 
on the news items appearing on the portal. The number of visits to the applicant 
company’s portal depended on the number of comments; the revenue earned from 
advertisements published on the portal, in turn, depended on the number of visits. 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant company had an economic 
interest in the posting of comments.
91
 … The Court therefore finds that the Supreme 
Court based its reasoning on this issue on grounds that were relevant for the purposes 
of Article 10 of the Convention.
92
 
It is nothing but a common sense that does not need scholarly proof: newspapers and 
magazines existed before and actually exist today without any form of public comment 
section. And it is the quality of the content provided, expertise of the staff journalists and the 
topicality of the issues covered, what makes media company either popular (and economically 
viable), or unpopular (and hence, unprofitable). Neither the Supreme Court, not the ECtHR 
provided an explanation why they believe that Delfi depended (emphasis added) on the 
number of comments rather than the published materials.  
As for the liability of the actual authors of the comments, the ECtHR observes both 
advantages and disadvantages of stealthy online presence. The Court takes into account that 
anonymity allows Internet users to stay invulnerable against theoretical reprisals as well as 
contributes to the free flow of ideas and information. Although, the Court notes next, 
technological capability of computer networks poses a hidden danger that cannot be ignored: 
speed of the Internet media in comparison to the traditional one may significantly deteriorate 
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the impact of the unlawful, defamatory speech.
93
 With regards to personalities of the real 
offenders, the Estonian courts have granted orders for disclosure of IP addresses of 
commentators who had posted presumably offensive comments and, therefore, names and 
home addresses of the holders of IP addresses in question. Even though the law enforcement 
agencies has shown ambiguous result of their investigation, in some cases it was absolutely 
possible to identify location and prospective owner of the personal computer from which the 
defamatory messages were published.
94
 Yet, the claims were brought solely against the Delfi., 
since the Estonian legislation provides an opportunity to choose against whom the claim will 
be filed. Besides that, the Court supposed that 
[T]he uncertain effectiveness of measures allowing the identity of the authors of the 
comments to be established, coupled with the lack of instruments put in place by the 
applicant company for the same purpose [of identification] with a view to making it 
possible for a victim of hate speech to effectively bring a claim against the authors of 
the comments, are factors that support a finding that the Supreme Court [of Estonia] 
based its judgment on relevant and sufficient grounds.
95
 
It means that even being aware of the fact that possibility to identify alleged perpetrators 
exists, the ECtHR has supported the view, that it is not necessary as long as the national law 
gives an opportunity to successfully sue the perfectly known entity, Delfi, and disregard real 
authors of the defamatory comments.  
The third factor that had influence on the legal analysis performed by the ECtHR touches 
upon the steps made by the Delfi administration in order to prevent widespread dissemination 
of harmful speech. Here the reasoning of the Court revolved around the fact, that taken 
measures has shown themselves insufficient. Delfi administration was unable to promptly 
remove defamatory comments without delay after publication, because their filtering 
mechanisms allowed unlawful messages to stay for more than a month, that would not happen 
if automatic filtration worked in a proper way. Furthermore, the Court expressed its firm 
opinion on the fears of collateral censorship motivated by legal overprotection. It stated that 
obligations to effectively monitor hate speech and incitements to violence “can by no means 
be equated to ‘private censorship’”.96 
The last aspect, domestic consequences for the applicant company, was explained by the 
ECtHR quite briefly. Petty amount of the penalty invalidates disproportionality arguments, 
but business model of Delfi did not have to undergo any changes in order to satisfy local court 
ruling. Simultaneously, Strasbourg judges indirectly commented the possibility of chilling 
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effect so far, with mentioning the term itself though. Consequences for other media players in 
post-Delfi era were as follows: operators “have taken down the offending comments but have 
not been ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage.”97 To sum up the key 
arguments by ECtHR in the most accurate way, final quote of the judgment will be provided: 
Based on the concrete assessment of the above aspects, taking into account the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in the present case, in particular the extreme nature of 
the comments in question, the fact that the comments were posted in reaction to an 
article published by the applicant company on its professionally managed news portal 
run on a commercial basis, the insufficiency of the measures taken by the applicant 
company to remove without delay after publication comments amounting to hate 
speech and speech inciting violence and to ensure a realistic prospect of the authors of 
such comments being held liable, and the moderate sanction imposed on the applicant 
company, the Court finds that the domestic courts’ imposition of liability on the 
applicant company was based on relevant and sufficient grounds, having regard to the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State. Therefore, the measure did 
not constitute a disproportionate restriction on the applicant company’s right to 





Before examining the academic articles outstanding lawyers from all around the world,  it is 
impossible to by the wordy dissenting opinion by judges Sajó and Tsotsoria, that followed the 
Grand Champer’s final decision. Only these two judges remained in opposition to the 
majority, that implicitly hints at quite a great degree of consensus among the Grand Chamber. 
Yet, sometimes those who find a courage to speak up against the majority, deserve more 
attention that those who joined it. Perhaps, this is the very same situation with Delfi, taking 
into account that it was the first case of its kind. Nevertheless, it is important to scrutinize this 
dissenting opinion. Among other concerns, judges Sajó and Tsotsoria have found it necessary 
to draw a parallel between this case and Jersild v. Denmark. They indicate an extremely 
obvious neglect of long-established principles by their colleagues.
99
 Even not familiar with all 
ECtHR niceties, any lawyer will be bewildered by the incoming moment. The court in its line 
of reasoning mentions one of dogmas, originated from the Jersild case and re-cited for many 
times in others:  
Punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by 
another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to 
discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are 
particularly strong reasons for doing so.
100
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So the court explicitly agrees, by citing decision of the past, that penalizing a press 
representative for the statements of third parties made during a professional conversation, 
would severely damage abilities of the media industry to contribute to the public discussion 
and raise important societal problems. And then, unbelievably, but this rule was simply 
ignored by the court when it had passed the decision. Not even a word from the prominent, 
standard-making case was mentioned in court’s rationale of Delfi AS v. Estonia. “[T]his 
principle is simply not discussed in the judgment,”101 as both judges summarized this 
surprising phenomenon.  
Unsurprisingly, Estonia was the first country where the academic criticism came from. It 
necessary to mention, that article to be discussed right now concerns the first ECtHR 
judgment in Delfi case, mady by the First Section in 2013, not the Grand Chamber’s ruling of 
2015. While those are two different proceedings, the second one reaffirms previous decision, 
allowing scholars to consider articles about any of the two. Estonian law researcher Mart Susi 
had observed that the decision in Delfi case raises two important questions.  
The first one challenges Court’s view that under the Estonian law interference with the media 
portal’s freedom of expression was forecastable beforehand. Chamber’s opinion reflected an 
idea that broader, more general legal norms can sometimes suit better than the pack of 
detailed provisions, when the utmost goal is to derive just conclusions on the basis of legal 
foreseeability. According to Susi, approach of such kind is pretty lightheaded: not only it 
leaves the concept of legal certainty meaningless, but also expects non-jurists to analyse 
general principles of  law  and by doing so come to the forecastable result. While the Court’s 
enthusiasm to improve legal literacy among mortals may be highly appreciated in the future, 
in today’s reality those expectations are rather draconic than enlightening and educational. 
Mart Susi also believes that relying on general norms in order to hold an online media portal 
accountable for third-party comments does not conform with deriving liability from either 
constitutional provisions, or ethical values. All of a sudden, the Court had demonstrated “the 
aspiration … to move away from interpretation of the law to assume a legislative function,”102 
leaving academics who have noticed it in perplexity.  
The second question raised by the Estonian law professor is whether the existing standards 
established by ECtHR for the conventional media players, such as printed periodicals or 
television, can be used for media models of newer generation, like the on in the Delfi case. On 
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the one hand, Court’s criterias had been developed when the Internet was nothing but a brave 
ambition of a small group of scientists and novelists. On another, the Court disregarded its 
well-known doctrine of looking at the Convention as the living instrument that allows to 
adjust the decision to the modern reality. Despite the fact that very purpose of this tradition is 
to assist judges in novel cases, which the Delfi appears to be, the Court stuck to the course of 
action dictated by famous three-part test.
103
 Hence, disallowed itself to review the actual 
necessity of the restriction prior to answering whether it was prescribed by national law. Who 
knows, maybe if Strasbourg judges have chosen to inverse order of the procedure, they would 
have come to the fundamentally different conclusions. But after all, the existing legislation 
quite often falls behind the newborn societal norms. Here logic of the Court once again 
demonstrated this inherent problem of law.
104
 Additional flaw of this judgment detected by 
Mart Susi is that the Court have failed to take an advantage of  “the first of its kind” judgment 
and advise national courts and governments of Council of Europe member states on how to 
ensure the protection of privacy in the era of anonymous Internet.
105
 
Another critical view on the Delfi case was delivered by an Irish professor of law Neville 
Cox. Notwithstanding that aim of his articles was to find discrepancies between ECtHR 
jurisprudence and UK Defamation Act (which is not the concern of this thesis), he also has 
expressed overall opinion about several aspects of the case. First of all, for several times the 
Court had indicated insignificance of the domestic fine, imposed on media company by 
national court and insisted, among other things, that tiny amount of the penalty itself justifies 
the restriction of the freedom of expression and by no means makes said restriction 
disproportionate. The Court turned a deaf ear to the nature of applicant’s business model and 
did not attribute any importance to the “simple concept of people being allowed to have their 
views posted in a contemporaneous and uncensored fashion”.106 
Continuing with this line, the Court also had never assessed whether the unmoderated 
discussion with regard to some socially important topic should be taken into account when 
there is need to balance out one’s reputation and other’s freedom of speech. Then Mr. Cox 
continues with critical and fairly deserved commentary. He argues that among dozens of lines 
of the judgment, the Court had demonstrated zero interest to the potential chilling effect, that 
ruling of the Supreme Court  of Estonia may have on others from the online media 
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 At the end of the day, being unsure of the legality of a particular comment, 
website owner will tend to limit this niche - damaging both their way of running a business 
and country’s overall index of the freedom of expression. Same questions were raised by 
other scholars. For example, Dr Richard Caddell from the Cardiff University believes that 
“the position taken by the court in Delfi provides a series of causes for concern.”108 
Moreover, it is possible to find another contradiction in the final decision. The Court first 
reiterates its traditional opinion about the role of press and journalism in a democratic 
society,
109
 but then neglects one circumstance. Despite all of the obscenity and offensive 
nature of the comments, they were directly referring to news of a substantial public interest. 
There is no doubt that those comments did not corresponded to the concept of societal interest 
themselves, but it may become an alarming trend when the Court simply refuses or considers 
inessential to evaluate public concern; for example, to discover what was the cause of 
offensive speech in question and represent its findings inside the judgment.
110
 
Finally, there is another moment that speaks not in favour of depth of the judicial analysis in 
Delfi case. The Strasbourg Court did not bother itself with the examination of each and every 
post out the 20 comments that were the backbone of the initial lawsuit against media holding. 
Yet, that kind of analysis could have contributed to the understanding whether and to what 
extent a particular comment negatively affected right to respect for privacy of ferry company 
owner, who had sued Delfi originally.
111
 The Court applied similar practice back in 2004, 
when the entire Von Hannover v. Germany case revolved around the nature of paparazzi 
photographs showing holydays of the Monaco royal family; the Court inspected all visual 




6. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS  
Before reaching this point, certain preconditions have been made. The recently established 
position of the European Court of Human Rights on the liability of Internet intermediaries on 
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example of Delfi AS v Estonia case, now can be looked upon from new, different angles, in 
context of the freedom of expression. This part of the paper seeks to find an answer on 
whether there could have been better, more careful adjudication? Of course, the word ‘better’ 
is rather frivolous and by itself means almost nothing, especially in the area of law. Here this 
notion contains the following. Are there any elements of the law, morals and general public 
utility, that were unintentionally left overboard by the famous Court in Strasbourg? Did the 
Court take into account all interested parties? And by all it means also those outside the 
courtroom procedure, not submitting any claims, not even aware of these proceedings. Is it 
possible to find some contradictions inside the wording of the judgment? Would it be bold 
enough to suppose that any of the proposed arguments can actually be considered by ECtHR 
judges in future? In an attempt to answer those questions and consequently provide the 
academic world with critical, improvement-eager view on the current ECtHR standpoint, this 
research has engaged into set of separate discussions. They include research findings stated in 
chapters about existing ECtHR standards of media freedom, the United States doctrine that 
handles issues of anonymity and intermediaries, economic perspective of intermediary 
liability with connections to the freedom of press, as well as academic criticism of the exact 
Delfi judgment. Altogether these realms give an opportunity to rethink the whole issue or, if 
that might be considered a bit radical, lay the foundation for future debates.  
First came the tenets that the Court have developed with regard to the general freedom of 
expression and its relation to media world. Throughout the years of activity, the Court created 
very definite and reliable standards; they have proven their efficiency in a number of cases 
where they were relied upon. Separately the prominent case of Jersild v. Denmark was 
examined, because its nature, apart from the lack of Internet those days, resembled the very 
essence of Delfi. Both cases fit the same formula: person A is being held liable for the 
dissemination of clearly unlawful messages made by person B. In Jersild, the convicted 
journalist himself did not express any of the derogatory remarks, but merely provided a 
platform for others to do so as a representative of a television programme. The Court stated, 
that notwithstanding the fact that media outlets shall not go beyond the limit of what 
constitutes “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, they also have a duty to 
inform the society about important public concerns, even if such information may be 
distressing, outrageous or provocative. Moreover, if taken responsibly, press activities  may 
also involve potential resort to the exaggeration or provocation, as ECtHR judges explicitly 
noticed in Jersild, merely reaffirming the findings of even older case - Prager and Oberschlick 
v. Austria. The analysis of the case law of pre-Internet era indicated, that the Court highlights 
the “intermediary” nature of Delfi more that its “media” and “public platform” facets. And 
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this, despite the fact that social interaction between commentators was related to the topic of 
great public concern. If done otherwise, the Court, probably, could have reached more 
balanced outcome.  
The second part of the analysis was dedicated to the comparative element, namely, the US 
approach on imposing liability on the online operators. The reason for an overseas choice is 
made up of two arguments. First, a comparative analysis between two fundamentally different 
system of laws, in this example - American and European, is an magnificent instrument for 
those who strain after the progress of jurisprudence and academic debate. And second, the 
rule of precedence used by the ECtHR is analogous to the practice of US courts, with the 
exemption that Convention is a ‘living instrument’ and deserves some degree of elasticity. As 
one can see, the American culture in this regard differs significantly from the continental one. 
The Internet intermediary is by federal law exempt from any kind of liability for user-
generated content; local lawsuits similar by their essence to the Delfi case have proven this 
rule. Although, it is highly unlikely that judges in Strasbourg will even mention this as their 
argumentation, outside of their primary job they might engage into philosophical discussions 
about the law with their colleagues and among other things debate about American legal 
traditions. After all, that is how different ideas and approaches are being exchanged in all 
human activities. And yet the law is extremely inelastic disciple, it is not an exception. 
The third part of research evaluated harmful effects, that may potentially result from imposing 
liability on Internet intermediaries for the third-party comments. First, the excessive 
regulation and fear of liability can make the comments section so burdensome for the media 
outlet, that it will be is more rational to simply terminate users’ conversation rather than 
actively monitor and moderate it. And as long as the commentary is one of the customer 
engagement tools, the amount of time average user spends on the webpage will drop, 
damaging intermediary’s financial position. Internet service providers, media among them, 
significantly contribute to the global economy. Apart from the obvious harm to the online 
media financial well-being, there is another effect:  recent studies observe a positive 
correlation between index of the press freedom and  speed of the economic development. 
Freedom of expression creates a transparent business environment, what in its turn attract 
foreign investors and decreases corruption levels. These arguments, if taken into consideration 
by the Court, could have supported to outweigh the importance of freedom of expression in its 
battle with  
At last but not least, the Delfi case itself was analysed; now from the point of view of its 
imperfections and serious shortcomings. Critical remarks from acknowledged legal scholars, 
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as well as the dissenting opinion of two judges taking part in Delfi trial, made it clear that 
ruling was far from perfect and disregarded several quite significant arguments. The first 
significant drawback was pointed out by two dissident judges, Sajó and Tsotsoria. They 
argued that the ECtHR did not follow its own standards, when passed a decision in Delfi: 
punishment of journalist or media outlet for disseminating of statements made by third 
persons would seriously hinder the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public 
concern. And even more, the Court mentioned that standard, but failed to apply to the online 
portal in question; according to the dissenting opinion, the ECtHR contradicted itself in the 
very judgment. The scholars of law who had analysed the outcome of Delfi case also found 
several weaknesses in Court’s logic. First, the Court’s opinion that the liability of 
intermediaries was foreseeable from the general principles of Estonian law was considered 
too harsh. The Court suddenly moved away from its traditional interpretation of law to 
assume the implicit legal function. What is more, honourable Court applied its three-pronged 
test, developed long before the existence of Internet, without taking into account modern 
realities and looking at the Convention as a “living instrument”, a famous practice for novel 
legal challenges. Consequently, such approach disabled the ECtHR from examining necessity 
of the restriction in the first place and whether it is prescribed by law in the second.  
The next target for academic criticism became Court’s insistence that moderate amount of 
imposed fine makes the restriction absolutely proportionate. However, the Court ignored the 
nature of Delfi’s business and how the moderate fine could evolve to substantial costs. More 
importantly, judges in Strasbourg had paid very little attention to the potential chilling effect 
of their decision. Other media outlets may consider it less perilous to abolish user comments 
entirely, in order to protect themselves from liability risks; they may lose certain customer 
segment, but would not have to bear additional expenses. That move can damage both 
business models of the media companies and freedom to participate in public discourse. 
Furthermore, the ECtHR did not comment on the societal interest of the issue that provoked 
hateful remarks. Despite the obscene and derogatory nature of comments, they were directly 
related to news of a significant public interest; it may become a disturbing tendency when the 
Court fails to examine public interests deeper and demonstrate its findings. The last important 
aspect of Delfi addressed by the academic scholars, also touches upon depth of the legal 
analysis. The Court did not bother itself with the analysis of each and every comment out the 
20 in total; notwithstanding the fact that such practice had been established by the case law, 
namely, Von Hannover v. Germany.  
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Considering the critical remarks by scholars of law, in future adjudications it would be 
desirable to conduct more comprehensive analysis, taking into consideration not only the dry 
black letter law, but also preconditions of the lawsuit and public interest. It is also quite 
important to bear in mind the elastic nature of the Convention, especially in case of novel 
challenges. Speaking about the novelty, it is also crucial to keep in mind long-term effects of 
the judgment, the precedence rule it establishes and dangers of the chilling effect, that 
inaccurate judgment may carry within itself. 
By combining the observations of dissident ECtHR judges and scholars of law, analysis of the 
various media business models and evidence from the empirical studies on how the freedom 
of press is linked to the economic prosperity, one can confidently claim that the paramount 
Delfi judgment is far from perfect. Heated debates in the academic circles only reaffirm the 
importance, even vital necessity of research works on the topic of intermediary liability in a 
modern cyber era. To conclude, it is worth to say that if the Delfi case existed in an isolation, 
then its final ruling would have been perfectly proportionate and reasonable, taking into 
consideration more than a moderate monetary fine and obnoxious nature of the comments. 
But the mechanism of the ECtHR case law works quite the opposite, by establishing 
landmarks for future proceedings. Thus, the task of the famous court in Strasbourg is to make 
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